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ABSTRACT
EMILY M. WAGER: Correcting Factual Misperceptions: How Source Cues Matter
(Under the direction of Pamela J. Conover.)
From the birther movement to the push of “alternative facts” from the White House, recent
events have highlighted the prominence of misinformation in the U.S. This study seeks to
broaden our understanding of under what conditions factual misperceptions may be effec-
tively corrected. Specifically, I use Social Identity Theory to argue that ingroup members,
specifically co-partisans and peers, are perceived to be more credible, and in turn are more
effective correctors, than outgroup members (out-partisans and elites), contingent on iden-
tity strength. I also argue that peers should be effective correctors among those with low
levels of institutional trust. To test my expectations, this study employs a 2 x 2 experimental
design with a control group to determine how successful various source cues are at chang-
ing factual beliefs about a hotly debated topic in the U.S.— immigration. Overall I find
preliminary support for my expectations.
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INTRODUCTION
A substantial amount of scholarship has been dedicated to examining the extent to which
citizens can participate meaningfully in politics. Scholars tend to agree that the typical
American is neither very interested nor informed about politics, though some argue such
shortcomings may not be all that consequential to the democratic process (Lupia and Mc-
Cubbins 1998). More recently, however, researchers have sought to explain the origins and
implications of a misinformed citizenry. While the uninformed may admit to their own ig-
norance, misinformed individuals display much more certainty and resilience, and in turn
present a greater risk in influencing policy debates and even political outcomes.
Given the political costs that factual misperceptions pose, scholars have just recently
begun to examine the ways in which they can be effectively corrected. The purpose of this
study is to broaden our understanding of the conditions under which factual mispercep-
tions may be successfully corrected by examining how social identities shape receptivity to
information. Specifically, I argue that the source of the corrections should shape how re-
ceptive individuals are to corrective information, and that ingroup members—particularly,
co-partisans and peers—should be more successful than outgroup members in reducing
misperceptions about immigration in the U.S, particularly among those who strongly iden-
tify with the group.
Correcting Factual Misperceptions
Recently much work has been devoted to illustrating the ostensible prevalence of false
beliefs concerning specific policies, the size of certain demographics, and even conspiracy
theories among the American public (Flynn N.d.; Thorson 2017; Lawrence and Sides 2014;
Hochschild and Einstein 2015). Despite the seemingly ubiquitous nature of misperceptions,
not much is known about how people acquire certain false beliefs or why some tend to
hold on to them so tenaciously. Most of the literature examining the causes of individual
misperceptions focuses on motivated reasoning (Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Flynn, Nyhan and
Reifler 2016). When citizens engage in motivated reasoning, they tend to readily accept
evidence that confirm their predispositions, actively argue against incongruent evidence
and seek out information that supports their worldview (Taber and Lodge 2006). In effect,
motivated reasoners, particularly those most passionate and knowledgeable about certain
issues, are unable to escape the pull of their own prior beliefs (Taber and Lodge 2006).
Strong beliefs in false claims, therefore, may not be easily corrected among those for who
they sit comfortably in their worldview.
Can misperceptions be effectively corrected? The results are mixed. Kuklinski, Quirk,
Jerit, Schwieder and Rich (2000) find that asking subjects how much of the federal budget
was spent on welfare, then immediately providing the correct answer, resulted in signifi-
cantly more liberal attitudes toward welfare. They conclude that the most successful cor-
rections are those performed bluntly, in a way that “hits them between the eyes”(Kuklinski
et al. 2000). Their study encourages optimism that voters are receptive to facts, but it con-
flates whether specific misperceptions or general policy attitudes (or both) were altered.
In a later experimental study by Nyhan and Reifler (2010), the authors find that not only
did corrections fail to reduce misperceptions among all subjects, but they actually strength-
ened misperceptions among conservatives. The fact that this “backfire” effect was observed
among the ideological group most inclined to report such falsehoods suggests that the ways
in which misperceptions are successfully and unsuccessfully corrected requires more care-
ful attention to who, how and what we are correcting. Indeed, an extensive body of work
has demonstrated what corrections do not work (Shin, Jian, Driscoll and Bar 2016; Nyhan
and Reifler 2013; Nyhan 2011). For example, correcting political innumeracy, such as the
number of American causalities in Iraq (Berinsky 2007) and the racial composition of the
U.S. population (Lawrence and Sides 2014) leads to no significant change in related pol-
icy attitudes. In sum, most studies have demonstrated that factual corrections have limited,
although to varying degrees, of success. Often these studies use corrective treatments that
are simple, subtle and typically embedded in mock new stories from ambiguous sources.
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However, it is important to remember that outside of the experimental setting, political in-
formation is hardly ever reported without some type of source information. And indeed,
an extensive body of work suggests that source cues shape how voters interpret messages
and form attitudes about politics, particularly via the level of credibility that they signal
(Druckman 2001; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Zaller 1992). Despite this, researchers study-
ing misperceptions have yet to fully explore how various source cues, and most importantly
the degree of identification with the source, can shape receptivity to corrective information.
The Importance of Source Cues
Research on source cues suggests that information is better received when the recipient
perceives the source as credible, meaning more trustworthy and convincing (Eagly and
Chaiken 1993). Limited work on correcting misperceptions demonstrates that source cues
do matter. For example, Nyhan and Reifler (2013) find that conservatives who incorrectly
believed Barack Obama had raised taxes were more likely to correct their misperception
if they received the same factual information from conservatives than from liberals. They
argue that shared ideology communicates source credibility, and therefore sources that are
similar ideologically to the recipient should be more persuasive.
On the other hand, some work may suggest that shared ideology is not sufficient criteria
for perceived credibility. To determine what source cues were most successful in reduc-
ing misperceptions about Obamacare, one experimental study manipulated the source to
be either a Republican senator, a Democratic senator or non-partisan expert groups (Berin-
sky 2015). The Republican correction was the most powerful for both Republicans and
Democrats, leading them to be more likely to reject the rumor and support health care
reform. Berinsky (2015) explains this by suggesting that when politicians make factual
statements that appear to run counter to their interests, it actually increases their credibility.
The results provided by Berinsky (2015) and Nyhan and Reifler (2013) are difficult to rec-
oncile. However, they both ignore the role that individual-level motivating variables—such
as strength of identification with the corrective source and degree of institutional trust—
play in perceptions of source credibility. This is a key part to the puzzle of Americans’
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ostensible resistance to facts that has been left unanswered.
Additionally, given that non-partisan groups had little success in debunking the Oba-
macare death panel rumor, Berinsky’s findings also highlight the potential limits of cor-
rections provided by experts. While extant work on misperceptions has almost exclusively
focused on how elites and experts shape opinion, little is known about how individuals
respond to corrections from members of their own social groups.
Theory and Hypotheses
While the evidence is mixed on how successful factual corrections can be, research on
source cues suggests the identity of the correcting source should matter. However, not much
is known about the extent to which people’s political or social ingroup members may be ef-
fective correctors in contrast to politicians, journalists or experts. Healthcare researchers
have begun to seek effective ways to counter common misperceptions that appear resis-
tant to expert opinion. For example, Attwell and Freeman (2015) take a social identity
approach to correcting misperceptions about the safety of vaccinations in Australia. They
find that a pro-vaccination campaign priming shared “alternative lifestyle” identity and ide-
ology encouraged alternative lifestyle parents to feel more positively toward vaccinating
their children. The campaign’s approach suggests two features—shared ideological world-
view and membership in a mutual or similar social circle—effectively communicate source
credibility.
Certainly motivated reasoning presents a tenacious force driving misperceptions, but
credible source cues should have the power to persuade voters to overcome such direc-
tional goals in favor of accuracy. Scholars studying misperceptions have not theorized about
whether source cues from ingroup members have a general advantage in correcting factual
beliefs, leaving a significant gap in the literature. Thus, I focus on two types of groups.
First I ask whether co-partisans are more successful at reducing misperceptions than out-
partisans; second, I ask whether peers are more effective at countering misperceptions than
elites.
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Social identities, such as race, class and gender, color the lens through which people
view public affairs and can guide political thought. Social Identity Theory (SIT) posits
that social identity is derived from group membership and that group members strive to
achieve or maintain a positive social identity to boost their self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner
1986). The theory entails that people will feel a psychological attachment to their group and
have ingroup favoritism. As Brewer (1997) notes, group boundaries develop with a sense
that ingroup members will adhere to social norms and rules, including cooperation and
reciprocal trust. Indeed, trust within groups is the rule of intergroup behavior (Schopler and
Insko 1992). It is this perception of ingroup member trustworthiness that acts as a cue for
credibility and in turn shapes how receptive group members are to information from other
members. However, it is important to remember that group identification, not simple group
membership, is the key to how social groups guide political thinking (Conover 1988). Thus,
I expect that the more one strongly identifies with a group, the more likely that individual
will be positively receptive to information from another ingroup member.
Partisanship in the U.S. not only provides a perceptual screen through which people
view political events and figures (Bartels 2002), but also constitutes a highly salient so-
cial identity (Huddy 2001; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2004). Therefore, individuals,
particularly strong partisans, should perceive their co-partisans as more trustworthy, and in
turn more credible, than outpartisans. Thus, the stronger one’s partisanship, the more likely
factual corrections provided by a co-partisan should reduce misperceptions than those pro-
vided by an outpartisan (H1). My approach departs from Berinsky (2015) and Nyhan and
Reifler (2013), who exclusively looks at party members. Here I expect that strength of party
identification matters in shaping individuals’ receptivity to the source cue, where specifi-
cally strong partisans should be most trusting of their co-partisans.
Group party dynamics may just be one part of the puzzle in what makes corrections
effective—the status of the source also should matter. Where prior work has exclusively
focused on corrections from ambiguous or elite sources, I posit that corrective information
provided by members of a social community an individual identifies with presents another
alternative that has yet to be examined. While voters do rely on the knowledge and opinions
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of political experts (Popkin 1995), some argue that being knowledgeable is not sufficient
criteria for voters to place their faith in experts; perceptions of integrity and benevolence
matter as well (Hendriks, Kienhues and Bromme 2015). Accumulating evidence demon-
strates the substantial political influence that peers or social group members may have on
each other (Gerber and Rogers 2009; Klar 2014). Indeed, scholarship across the social
science disciplines consistently shows that for one person to influence another, the two
should share some level of social connectedness. For example, in her examination of the
significance of political discussion within local communities, Walsh (2004) convincingly
argues that because such social group members readily identify with one another, they are
less likely to discount what a peer might say even if it diverges from their own opinions.
Therefore, in addition to copartisans, peers within one’s social community, particularly a
community he or she strongly identifies with, also represent another meaningful and salient
social ingroup. Thus I posit that the more one identifies with their social community, the
more likely that corrections provided by a peer will be effective than those provided by an
elite (H2).
Finally, in addition to identification with the source, other individual-level variables may
also affect receptivity to information. For example, Hetherington and Kam (N.d.) demon-
strate that the military, one of the most trusted institutions among the public, is uniquely
successful in heightening support for progressive environmental policies among those who
place a substantial amount of trust in it. Therefore, in addition to identification with a
source, trust acts a cue for source credibility, and should be another significant component
to successful persuasion. For example, institutional trust should moderate how receptive
people are to corrections from establishment elites. Given recent rises of populism in the
U.S., understanding what sources other than elites are effective correctors proves impor-
tant. Peers within one’s social community provide a stong alternative. Therefore, my final
hypothesis is peers should be more likely to reduce misperceptions especially among those
with low levels of institutional trust (H3).
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Data and Measures
Data. To evaluate the effectiveness of corrective information provided by ingroup mem-
bers (specifically co-partisans and peers) versus outgroup members (outpartisans and elites)
on reducing political misperceptions, I designed a survey experiment using undergraduate
students at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. While perhaps student samples are
not ideal, they still resemble the mass public on many non-demographic factors (Druckman
and Kam 2011). An online survey with an embedded experiment was used by Qualtrics and
administered to students enrolled in a large introductory course where they receive course
credit for participation. A follow-up survey was then sent out to be completed a week later.
One hundred and seventy four students opted to participate in the first survey. All respon-
dents were reasonably representative of the American adult population both in terms of
gender (54.8 % female) and race (24.5% non-white).
Independent Variables. To begin the first survey, respondents completed a battery of po-
litical and social predispositions. Democrats, Republicans, and Independents were grouped
with a standard 7-point partisanship scale. Partisans include strong and weak partisans.1
Also, given that how strongly individuals identify with certain groups shapes the way they
interpret the political world, two questions were asked to gauge partisanship as a social
identity: (1) “Being a (Democrat/Republican) is important to my sense of what kind of
person I am.” and (2) “I have a strong attachment to other people who are (Democrat-
s/Republicans).” Responses are scored on 7-point scales from “strongly agree” to “strongly
disagree” with a neutral midpoint (α= .86, M=3.28, SD = 1.43).
To determine how much subjects identified with their immediate social community (in
this case, the university the students attend) they were asked the same two social identity
questions from above in reference to being a university student. Responses were coded so
that higher values indicate stronger group identity (α= .77, M=5.74, SD = 1.01). There are
both benefits and drawbacks to identifying the university as a peer group. While this group
1 For a convenience sample, respondents were slightly skewed toward the Democratic party (29% Repub-
lican or lean Republican, 6% independent, 64% Democrat or lean Democrat).
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is both large and broad, it provides a guaranteed common peer group for all subjects—
whether they choose to strongly identify with the group or not, they are all members. On the
other hand, there are potential limits to generalizability of such a peer group. For example,
there may be something inherently unique to being a student at UNC Chapel Hill that does
not exist in other university communities or peer groups. Despite these limits, the university
provides an identifiable, immediate social group for all subjects and appears sufficient for
the purpose of this study.
Trust in various groups were each gauged with a 4-point item, running from “no trust
at all” to “a lot of trust”, and recoded where higher values indicate more trust. Institutional
trust is an additive index of three items indicating how much trust subjects have in the (1)
federal government, (2) media, and (3) public authorities (α= .56, M=2.38, SD = .46).2
Dependent Variables. Respondents were then asked 14 questions which they were told
was intended to gauge their general knowledge about politics. Nine of the items were
standard political knowledge questions (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) where respondents
were given a series of options to choose from with only one correct answer, and were in-
cluded to obscure the true nature of the study to subjects. Of the 14 political knowledge
items in the questionnaire, four are the primary points of interest. These four items were
assertions regarding immigration in the U.S., including (a) “Undocumented immigrants are
able to receive government welfare benefits like food stamps and housing benefits.” (b)
“The majority of immigrants do not learn to speak English, (c) “Immigrants are more likely
to become criminals than native born citizens.”(d)“In contrast to previous administrations,
the Obama administration had a record high number deportations of undocumented immi-
grants.” Immigration represents a highly contentious issue that is tied to partisanship and
has been subject to various rumors and misperceptions in national political discourse. Of the
four statements, all are false except the item about Obama’s deportations. These statements
focus on broad misperceptions, rather than specific numbers or figures, which the average
voter is typically poor at estimating (Lawrence and Sides 2014). The first three statements
2 These trust scales were developed by Naef and Schupp (2009), who they distinguish between different
types of trust: institutional, social and general trust.
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also represent misperceptions that collectively touch on both the perceived cultural and
economic threats that immigration poses to many Americans. Since the Democratic party
is on average more sympathetic to immigrants, the statement about Obama’s deportations
was included for ideological balance. While these may not be the most prominent rumors
circulating political discourse today, they are certainly prevalent among the contemporary
American public (Weeks, 2015).3
Factual beliefs about immigration were tapped with a 7-point item, from extremely con-
fident is true to extremely confident is false, with a neutral midpoint (“unsure/ don’t know”).4
All responses were recoded where higher values indicate stronger misperceptions. The sur-
vey also included an additional false statement about immigration (“Undocumented immi-
grants do not pay taxes.”), which was not addressed in the treatment in order to determine if
misperceptions changed without explicit corrections. After completing the political knowl-
edge survey, respondents completed a distractor task followed by the actual experiment,
where they were asked to read an article about an important news topic of the day, which
serves as the corrective treatment. They then completed a political knowledge survey iden-
tical to the one they had filled out before the treatment.
In total there are four dependent variables, one for each item in the article about immi-
gration. Because I am interested in actual change in reported factual beliefs from before
to after corrections, the dependent variable was calculated by subtracting each subject’s
pre-treatment score from his or her post treatment score. Positive values therefore indi-
cate change in the accurate direction following the treatment, while negative values signal
change in the inaccurate direction (“backfire effect”), and a score of zero means no change
3 It is also worth noting that these items may be more relevant to actual attitudes towards immigration
than other misperceptions that have been the focus of prior research. For example, Hopkins, Sides and Citrin
(2016) find that correcting political innumeracy about the number of immigrants in the U.S. at the local and
national level did not change immigration attitudes. This might be because people are more likely to have
concerns about the degree to which immigrants integrate into American culture (Citrin, Lerman, Murakami
and Pearson 2007) or perceived personal economic effects, such as beliefs about immigrants paying taxes
or their access to government services (Gerber, Huber, Biggers and Hendry 2017). The four items about
immigration were chosen for this study because it is likely that they matter to Americans’ attitudes toward
immigration.
4 See appendix for full wording.
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at all took place.5 Therefore it is important to note that in the context of this study, if
subjects have “reduced misperceptions” this could mean a shift from strongly accepting
a falsehood to strongly rejecting it, but it could also mean shifting from having strong to
weak confidence in their (incorrect) factual beliefs. Either way, I define any movement in
the positive direction on this scale as movement toward strongly accepting the facts.
Treatment. The article subjects saw appeared to be a letter to the editor about immi-
gration, embedded with factual information that directly corrected the aforementioned false
statements (see appendix). For the treatment, respondents were randomly assigned into to
one of five conditions: (1) a control group, where the article had no author, which serves
as the baseline, (2) a Republican elite condition, where the author was Mitch McConnell
(R), (3) a Democratic elite condition, where the author was Chuck Schumer (D), (4) a
Republican peer condition, where the author was a university student and self identified
Republican and (5) a Democratic peer condition where the author was a university student
and self identified Democrat. The name of the author was identical across peer treatments
and gender neutral (e.g., Taylor Anderson). In total, this survey took subjects about 15 min-
utes to complete. As a manipulation check, after subjects filled out the surveys they were
asked to identify the affiliation of the article’s author.
Dummy variables were created to represent whether the source of the correction was
from the political party subjects identified with or not. If, for example, a self-reported
Republican saw an article that was attributed to Chuck Schumer, that combination would
be coded as “outparty” and “elite”. This coding excludes true Independents who did not lean
toward one party, participants associated with a third party, or those who did not respond
to political affiliation question. This coding does include party leaners, who are typically
closet partisans with affective attachments to a single party (Petrocik 2009). Of the 174
subjects who participated in the experiment, 11 of them are classifed as true Independents.
Follow-up survey. Approximately one week after the experiment, subjects were asked to
complete another short survey measuring political knowledge. This questionnaire included
5 There are other possible ways to code the dependent variable, but given the distributions of responses
(see appendix), this choice appears sufficient for the purpose of this study.
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the same fourteen knowledge items, including those on immigration that they answered in
the first wave. Some evidence suggests that a portion of individuals who had been success-
fully corrected eventually fell back toward their predispositions over time (Berinsky 2015).
The purpose of the follow-up survey is to determine if the effects of the corrections are only
ephemeral or actually persist beyond the experimental setting. Responses to each of the
statements about immigration from the first wave (post treatment) and second wave were
collapsed and recoded into one of three groups: “Accept falsehood”, “Reject falsehood”, or
“Don’t know”. Since any movement between the two waves on the original 7-point Likert
scale would be more likely due to measurement error than actual change in beliefs, collaps-
ing subjects’ responses into either simple acceptance or rejection of false statements aims
to account for this. Out of the 174 subjects who completed the first survey, 133 completed
the second.
Results
I proceed by summarizing first how subjects generally responded to corrections about
immigration, then whether this varied by the source cue of the correction and finally, how
these cues interact with identity strength and institutional trust.
One of the most striking findings from this experiment is how much responses shifted
following the treatment. For example, while only 9% of all respondents reported that they
were “strongly confident” that undocumented immigrants do not receive welfare benefits
before seeing the article, this figure jumps to 53% post treatment. A similar trend is ob-
served with respect to the three other dependent variables. A simple frequency distribution
of the 7-point scale for each of the four items, pre and post treatment, can be seen in the
appendix. As the figures illustrate, all items saw substantial movement. At the highest
end, over 70% of subjects moved one or more points in the positive direction on the scale
for welfare benefits. On the lowest end, 40% of subjects moved one or more points in the
positive direction for the statement about immigrant criminality.
To provide a broader illustration of how subjects changed their reported beliefs from
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Table 1: Factual Beliefs Before Corrections
Commit Obama’s Receive Welfare Speak Do Not Pay
Crimes Deportations Benefits English Taxes
Reject Falsehood 74.2 24.5 50.3 74.8 36.2
Don’t Know 16.6 14.7 19.6 12.9 14.7
Accept Falsehood 9.2 60.7 30.1 12.2 49.1
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N=163. Note: The top three rows present the percentage of respondents that rejects, accepts or is
unsure about each statement about immigration. This is presented for each of the five items.
Table 2: Factual Beliefs After Corrections
Commit Obama’s Receive Welfare Speak Do Not Pay
Crimes Deportations Benefits English Taxes
Reject Falsehood 84.0 66.9 80.4 90.8 26.4
Don’t Know 11.0 8.5 7.3 6.1 17.8
Accept Falsehood 4.9 23.9 12.3 3.1 55.8
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N=163. Note: The top three rows present the percentage of respondents that rejects, accepts or is
unsure about each statement about immigration. This is presented for each of the five items.
before to after being exposed to corrective information, I collapsed responses on the seven
point scale into one of three categories: reject falsehood, don’t know and accept falsehood.
The percent of subjects whose responses fell into each of these categories is presented in
Table 1 and Table 2. As shown in the two tables, all four dependent variables experienced
considerable movement following the correction. In contrast, the statement about undoc-
umented immigrants paying taxes, which was not addressed in the treatment, saw little
change. In fact it is the only item in which the percent of subjects who reject the falsehood
actually increases following the treatment.
Party Cues
To test my first hypothesis, I regressed change in factual beliefs for each of the four
statements on the party source cue x party identity strength 2-way interaction, with the
control group as the baseline, resulting in four models presented in Table 3. Looking at the
results in Table 3, it initially appears that the outparty cue significantly reduces mispercep-
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tions about the criminality of immigrants (p < 0.01) on the scale by about 1.85 points on
average. This result initally appears to run counter to my expectations.
Table 3: Effect of Party Cues and Party Identity Strength on Factual Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commit Obama Welfare Speak
Crime Deportations Benefits English
Inparty 0.32 −1.44 −0.32 −0.14
(0.60) (1.52) (0.82) (0.61)
Outparty 1.85∗∗∗ 0.97 0.71 −0.27
(0.56) (1.42) (0.76) (0.56)
Party ID Strength 0.19 0.19 −0.11 −0.012
(0.13) (0.33) (0.18) (0.13)
Inparty X Party ID Strength −0.13 0.15 0.27 0.056
(0.17) (0.43) (0.23) (0.17)
Outparty X Party ID Strength −0.49∗∗∗ −0.53 −0.084 0.15
(0.17) (0.42) (0.22) (0.17)
Constant −0.074 1.93∗ 1.31∗∗ 1.07∗∗
(0.43) (1.09) (0.59) (0.44)
Observations 163 162 163 163
R2 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02
OLS regression coefficents with standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
However, as stated earlier, my first hypothesis is that strength of party identity should
be a mediating variable between source cues and changes in beliefs. The interaction term
in Model 1 between outparty and identity strength is significant at the p < 0.01 level,
suggesting the effect of the source cue does vary by identity strength. Since interaction
terms can be difficult to interpret, I have plot the estimated marginal effect of the correction
from Model 1 and the 90% confidence interval over the range of party identity strength in
Figure 1.
For subjects that strongly identified with their party, the effect is statistically significant
and negative. Thus the outparty correction led strong party identifiers to be more likely
to agree that immigrants are disproportionally criminals (“backfire” effect). The outparty
correction did not have a statistically significant effect on individuals who described them-
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Fig. 1: Effect of Outparty Correction on Beliefs about Immigrants and Crime
Estimated marginal effect by strength of party identity. Higher values of party identity strength
indicate greater party attachment. Positive values on the y-axis signify change in factual beliefs in
the positive direction.
selves as having moderate identity strength. Although, for those who had weak attachment
to their party, the outparty correction is statistically significant and positive. Therefore,
while it would first appear that outparty members are superior correctors to inparty mem-
bers, the story is much more nuanced. Strength of party identification matters, where weak
partisans will be receptive to information from outparty members but for strong partisans,
these corrections will backfire, strengthening misperceptions.
To determine if party attachment significantly interacted with source cues from any of
the four models, I plotted the estimated marginal effect of the correction for each of the
interaction terms in Table 3. No statistically significant relationships were found with the
exception of inparty cues and misperceptions about undocumented immigrants’ welfare
benefits, which is shown in Figure 2. For individuals whose party attachment is above
the midpoint, the effect of the inparty correction is positive and marginally significant.
Therefore, in support of H1, corrections from inparty members were most successful among
those who strongly identified with their party.
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Fig. 2: Effect of Inparty Correction on Beliefs about Undocumented Immigrants’ Welfare Benefits
Estimated marginal effect by strength of party identity. Higher values of party identity strength
indicate greater party attachment. Positive values on the y-axis signify change in factual beliefs in
the positive direction.
Peer and Elite Cues
In order to test my second hypothesis, I regressed change in each of the four factual
beliefs on the source cue (peer or elite) dummies and strength of peer group identity. The
results of the four regression models are shown in Table 4. At first glance, no statistically
significant relationships appear in the models. It is unclear why corrections from elites and
peers do not elicit significantly different responses. It is possible that while party cues are
able to send strong signals and have the potential to be divisive, the contrast between elites
and peers does not pack quite the same punch. Another possibility is that the university
community as a whole is not as meaningful as the subcommunities within it.
However, my expectations require examining interactive relationships, so I again plotted
the marginal effects of all interaction terms in all four models. Peer group identity did not
significantly affect receptivity to either peer or elite cues, with the exception of peer correc-
tions on beliefs about welfare benefits for undocumented immigrants. The marginal effects
plot is shown in Figure 3. The effect is positive and significant among those with strong
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Table 4: Effect of Peer/Elite Cues and Peer Group Identity on Factual Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commit Obama Welfare Speak
Crime Deportations Benefits English
Elite 0.19 −1.20 1.08 1.21
(1.67) (3.97) (2.16) (1.61)
Peer −0.27 2.55 −1.04 −0.22
(1.61) (3.84) (2.09) (1.55)
Peer Group Identity −0.038 −0.15 −0.037 0.077
(0.23) (0.56) (0.30) (0.23)
Elite X Peer Group Identity −0.011 0.13 −0.13 −0.17
(0.28) (0.67) (0.36) (0.27)
Peer X Peer Group Identity 0.081 −0.64 0.29 0.052
(0.27) (0.65) (0.35) (0.26)
Constant 0.71 3.37 1.22 0.58
(1.41) (3.36) (1.83) (1.36)
Observations 163 162 163 163
R2 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.02
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
peer group identity (approximately 5.5 and above on a 7-point scale). Thus compared with
controls, the peer correction worked as expected, as it was most likely to reduce mispercep-
tions among those with high levels of peer group attachment. Although I find no significant
interactive relationships for any of the other items, these results provide preliminary support
for my second hypothesis.
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Fig. 3: Effect of Peer Correction on Beliefs about Undocumented Immigrants’ Welfare Benefits
Estimated marginal effect by strength of peer group identity. Higher values of peer identity strength
indicate greater attachment to peer group. Positive values on the y-axis signify change in factual
beliefs in the accurate direction.
Institutional Trust and Source Cues
To test my final hypothesis that peers are especially successful correctors among those
with low levels of institutional trust, I regressed the same four dependent variables on
elite/peer dummy variables, interacting them with institutional trust. The results of the four
models, shown in Table 5, indicate there are no significant relationships between institu-
tional trust and peer/elite source cues on changes in factual beliefs with one exception. For
the first model, the interaction term between peer cue and trust is significant at the p < 0.10
level, suggesting that the effect of the peer correction does vary by institutional trust.
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Table 5: Effect of Peer/Elite Cues and Institutional Trust on Factual Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commit Obama Welfare Speak
Crime Deportations Benefits English
Elite 1.40 −1.49 −0.58 0.30
(1.31) (3.21) (1.73) (1.29)
Peer 2.39∗ −2.73 −0.96 0.12
(1.31) (3.21) (1.73) (1.28)
Institutional Trust 0.46 −0.88 −0.47 0.032
(0.42) (1.02) (0.55) (0.41)
Elite X Trust −0.52 0.46 0.40 −0.039
(0.53) (1.29) (0.70) (0.52)
Peer X Trust −0.94∗ 0.69 0.67 −0.030
(0.55) (1.34) (0.72) (0.54)
Constant −0.63 4.61∗ 2.14 0.95
(1.02) (2.50) (1.35) (1.00)
Observations 163 162 163 163
R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
To illustrate this interactive relationship, the estimated marginal effect of the peer cor-
rection and the 90% confidence interval over the range of institutional trust in shown in
Figure 4. In line with my expectations, for individuals with low levels of institutional trust
(less than 2 on a 4-point scale), peer corrections had a positive and significant marginal
effect, moving subjects’ factual beliefs about welfare in the accurate direction.
However, among those who reported having a lot of trust in institutions, peer corrections
appear to produce a negative and marginally significant effect, suggesting that corrective
information provided by a peer causes such individuals to “backfire”. What are we to make
of this finding? One possible interpretation is that subjects with high levels of institutional
trust perceive their peers as less credible than elites, leading them to be less receptive to
information from peers on average.
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Fig. 4: Effect of Peer Correction and Institutional Trust on Beliefs about Immigrants and Crime
Estimated marginal effect by strength of peer group identity. Higher values of institutional trust
signify greater reported trust. Positive values on the y-axis signify change in beliefs in the accurate
direction.
Follow-Up Survey
Lastly, a follow-up survey was distributed in order to determine if the power of correc-
tions held up over time. A simple illustration of the percent of those in the second wave
who accept, reject or were unsure about each item is shown in Table 6. Overall, the distri-
butions in Table 6 are fairly similar to those observed following the corrections in the first
wave (Table 2) with a couple of standout exceptions. First, there was about a 15% jump
in those who reported that the Obama administration had a record number of deportations6
from the first wave to the second wave. In other words, subjects were more likely to an-
swer correctly a week after the experiment than directly following it. It is unclear why this
is, but it is possible that some subjects were skeptical of the article during the experiment,
but encountered confirmatory information before taking the follow-up survey. A similar
trend was found with respect to the item about undocumented immigrants paying taxes,
6 Unlike the other items, this statement is a truth, not a falsehood.
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Table 6: Factual Beliefs: Wave Two
Commit Obama’s Receive Welfare Speak Do Not Pay
Crimes Deportations Benefits English Taxes
Reject Falsehood 84.2 82.7 77.4 85.7 56.4
Don’t Know 8.3 7.5 11.3 7.5 16.5
Accept Falsehood 7.52 9.8 11.3 6.8 27.1
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N=133. The top three rows present the percentage of respondents that rejects, accepts or is unsure
about each statement about immigration in the week following the experiment. This is presented for
each of the five items.
where from the first to the second wave there was a 30-point jump in the number of subjects
who rejected the falsehood. Since this was the only statement that subjects were not given
corrective information about, it is possible that subjects sought out the facts on their own.
To gain a clearer understanding of how many of those who reported correct beliefs
following the treatment held these beliefs over time, I compared the responses of subjects
who completed both the first survey and the follow-up survey a week later. The results
can be seen in Table 7. The comparisons suggest the vast majority of those who reported
correct factual beliefs at the end of the first wave reported correct beliefs in the second
wave. For example, of the 114 subjects who rejected the false statement that the majority
of immigrants do not learn to speak English following the treatment, almost 90% of them
rejected the same statement a week later. A similar trend holds across the other dependent
variables. So while there is some evidence of treatment effects subsiding over time, it
is relatively small. However, the item about undocumented immigrants paying taxes, for
which subjects were not given corrective information about, looks quite different. Among
those subjects who were correct for this item in the first wave (38 out of 133), less than
40% of them reported rejected the falsehood when asked a week later. This finding stands
in stark contrast to the other four items which were addressed in the treatment, where for
each item at least 80% of subjects who rejected a falsehood in the first wave did so in the
second. Thus these results suggest that not only does corrective information lead to actual
change in factual beliefs, but it also can help sustain those beliefs. Lastly, no significant
differences in over time effects were found across source cue treatments.
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Table 7: Accurate Responses Across Two Survey Waves
Dependent Variable Reject Falsehood Reject Falsehood Remain
(Wave 1 Post Treatment) (Wave 2) Correct (%)
Commit Crimes 114 102 89.5%
Obama’s Deportations 92 81 88%
Receive Welfare Benefits 106 88 83%
Speak English 122 108 88.5%
Do Not Pay Taxes 38 14 36.8%
N = 133. Remain correct was calculated by dividing the number of correct responses in the second
wave by the number of correct responses in the first wave (post treatment). Correct responses in the
second wave include only those who answered correctly in the first and second waves.
Discussion
The experiments in this paper help us understand how factual beliefs about politics
can be changed by manipulating the source of the corrections. I find that responses to
corrections from peers and co-partisans differ significantly according to subjects’ group
identity and trust in institutions. As a result, the corrections about immigration are most
successful among those that strongly identify with the group the source is a member of,
whether a co-partisan or peer.
My findings contribute to the literature on correcting misperceptions in several respects.
First, while prior corrections research has exclusively used a between-subjects design to
circumvent the possibility that people feel grounded in their responses before receiving
correction to after (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010), this study employed a within-subjects design
in order to establish how subjects actually change their factual beliefs. Indeed, my findings
demonstrate that substantial movement in reported factual beliefs does happen following
corrections and that these beliefs typically hold over time.
Second, the results from this study corroborate previous work demonstrating that the
impact of source cues on opinion varies systematically by individual identification with the
source (Hartman and Weber 2009). Among those who strongly identify with their party,
inparty corrections are successful in moving factual beliefs in the accurate direction while
outparty corrections lead to a “backfire” effect, pushing individuals in the opposite direc-
tion. On the other hand, weak partisans are receptive to corrective information from outparty
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members. Therefore, while the literature on the impact of ideological source cues on cor-
recting misperceptions has offered inconsistent findings (Nyhan and Reifler 2013; Berinsky
2015), the results in this paper demonstrate that not all Republicans and Democrats respond
uniformly to corrections—strength of group identification matters. While I theorize that
perceived credibility of ingroup and outgroup members is the causal mechanism at work, it
would be valuable to directly study how individuals evaluate various sources on key char-
acteristics (trustworthiness, knowledge, etc.,). This would allow social scientists to gain a
better understanding of specifically why certain sources are successful and others are not.
While research on source cues in political science has largely focused on partisan cues,
these findings also contribute to our understanding of how voters respond to information
from elites and peers. In accordance with my expectations, I find some evidence that peers
are more successful correctors than elites, especially among those who strongly identify
with their peer group and among those have weak trust in institutions. These findings add
to existing work (Attwell and Freeman 2015) seeking to understand how social groups can
promote accuracy in cases when experts or elites appear ineffective. Future work should
further explore how voters evaluate the credibility of elites and peers differently, and what
other individual-level factors might explain why certain people are more receptive to polit-
ical information from peers than elites. It would also be valuable to replicate these findings
on peer groups other than university students or use real peers that are not fabricated. Lastly,
while peer cues in this experiment did not have the substantial impact on factual beliefs that
were expected across all four statements, they should not be concluded as irrelevant. Walsh
(2004) illustrates the importance of face-to-face interactions among small peer groups in
political thinking. It is possible that factual corrections in the context of these sort of peer
interactions are effective, and scholars should aim to understand the significance of such
interactions in the real world.
Of course, I am mindful of the inherent limitations of the evidence presented here. The
most serious limitation to this experiment was the scale used to measure the dependent
variable, which confounds confidence and acceptance/rejection of false statements. For this
reason it is difficult to untangle the differences between changes in acceptance or rejection
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of beliefs and actual confidence in beliefs. For example, it could be possible that a peer
correction could just make subjects more confident in their already (correct) beliefs, and not
actually encourage a switch from acceptance to rejection of a false statement. Subsequent
studies should unpack these distinctions.
There is also the question over whether individuals’ reported factual beliefs are in fact
sincere and not just expressive partisan cheerleading (Bullock, Gerber and Seth 2015). I
argue that sincerity is largely inconsequential here. If subjects are willing to report strong
confidence in falsehoods in a survey, this cannot be completely irrelevant to the way they
perceive the political world. Lastly, if misperceptions are successfully corrected, it is no
guarantee that subjects’ respective political attitudes are actually moved in a certain direc-
tion. As Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton and Verkuilen (2007) note, those who “update
their beliefs accordingly need not imply they update their opinions accordingly [emphasis
added]” (p. 971). However, because factual beliefs and attitudes are so conflated, measuring
the two together in a questionnaire might have discouraged individuals from accurately up-
dating because they are reminded that certain beliefs are inconsistent with their worldview.
The purpose of this study is only to examine the conditions under which strong beliefs in
falsehoods (not issue positions) can be effectively challenged, but future work should ex-
plore how relevant factual beliefs shape opinions on immigration. While prior work has
found no evidence that correcting factual beliefs about immigrant population sizes leads
to attitude change (Lawrence and Sides 2014; Hopkins, Sides and Citrin 2016), these are
likely not the only factual beliefs that inform voters’ respective attitudes.
23
APPENDIX
Appendix A: Treatment
Understanding the Realities of Immigration — (Author)
Many Americans are simply misinformed about immigration in this country. Such mis-
understandings have turned our political discourse over immigration into a battle of false-
hoods. To have a civil debate about both legal and illegal immigration in the U.S., we all
must be on the same playing field when it comes to the facts.
For example, I consistently hear that undocumented immigrants are able to receive gov-
ernment benefits created for citizens. But the fact is that the under the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, undocumented immigrants are
prohibited from receiving such benefits, including: welfare, food stamps, unemployment or
disability compensation, public housing, and non-emergency health coverage.
Also, I often hear that a vast majority of immigrants do not learn to speak English. This
simply is not true: only seven percent of second generation Latinos use Spanish as their
main language. Likewise, some claim that immigrants are more likely to become criminals
than native-born citizens. But, numerous researchers have found that immigrants are much
less likely to commit crimes and be incarcerated than the average population. Lastly, some
claim that under the Obama administration, immigration policies were lax and deportations
declined. This was not the case. President Obama carried out more deportations than
previous presidents, setting a record of more than 2.4 million formal removals.
Only some of the false claims surrounding the immigration debate have been addressed
here. And there are many serious problems that we as Democrats and Republicans must
consider as we discuss immigration policy. However, we cannot begin to work together if
we do not agree on the facts.
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Appendix B: Question Wording of the Dependent Variable
Undocumented immigrants are able to receive government welfare benefits like food stamps
and housing benefits.
— Extremely confident is false [1]
— Mostly confident is false [2]
— Slightly confident is false [3]
— Unsure/Don’t Know [4]
— Slightly confident is true [5]
— Mostly confident is true [6]
— Extremely confident is true [7]
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Appendix C: Frequency Distribution of Survey Responses
Fig. 5: Frequency Distribution of Responses Pre and Post Treatment
Frequency distribution of responses for each of the four dependent variables, pre and post treatment.
Factual beliefs about immigrants paying taxes are also included. Higher values on the x-axis indicate
stronger misperceptions.
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